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CASE NOTES 
Banking Law-OVERDRAFTS-LIABILITY FOR OVERDRAFTS OF A 
JOINT BANK ACCOUNT UNDER THE UCC-Cambridge Trust Co. v. 
Carney, 333 A.2d 442 (N.H. 1975). 
Peter and Ann Carney were permanently separated in June 
1971 after four years of marriage. In September of that year, Mrs. 
Carney's attorney negotiated a preliminary support agreement 
with Mr. Carney. In order to fulfill his support obligation under 
the agreement, Mr. Carney indicated to his wife that he would 
pay her a substantial amount of money from a personal checking 
account he had recently opened a t  the Cambridge Trust Co.' Mrs. 
Carney accompanied her husband to Cambridge Trust to obtain 
this money. Believing that by adding her name to her husband's 
account she would be certain to receive the promised money, Mrs. 
Carney became a cosignatory on Mr. Carney's account, thus 
transforming it into a joint account. In order to create the joint 
account, Mr. and Mrs. Carney jointly signed a letter and a new 
signature card in which they agreed to indemnify Cambridge 
Trust for all checks written by either of them under the a c ~ o u n t . ~  
Mr. Carney then drew a check against the account payable to his 
wife for $38,500, of which Mrs. Carney deposited $20,000 in the 
form of a 2-year savings certificate at  a savings and loan. There- 
after, Mrs. Carney did not draw any checks against the joint 
- - pp 
1. While Mr. Carney maintained the account in his personal capacity, i t  was over- 
drawn on six separate occasions. Cambridge Trust Co. v. Carney, 333 A.2d 442,443 (N.H. 
1975). 
2. The indemnification agreement was actually a letter addressed to the bank desig- 
nated "special instructions," stating as follows: 
Referring to the account standing in the name of P. Gerard Carney & Co. it is 
our wish that you add to this account the name of Ann Carney making it  a Joint 
Account. Please honor and charge to this account all checks when signed by 
either of us, or by the survivor in case of the death of either, and we agree to 
indemnify and hold you harmless in so doing. , 
Brief for Appellant a t  4, Cambridge Trust Co. v. Carney, 333 A.2d 442 (N.H. 1975) 
[hereinafter briefs for the appellant and appellee filed in the instant case will be referred 
to as Appellant's Brief and Appellee's Brief respectively]. The signature card contained 
the following provision: 
We are this day opening an account on your books in the name of the under- 
signed as a joint account. Please accept any items payable to either of the 
undersigned and place the same to our joint credit. Please honor and charge to 
this account all checks when signed by either of us, or by the survivor in case of 
the death of either. We agree to indemnify and hold you harmless in so doing. 
Id. at 5. 
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account, did not deposit any money in it, and did not receive any 
statements from the bank regarding it. In February 1972, $10,000 
of Mrs. Carney's deposit in the savings and loan was attached by 
Cambridge Trust to recover an overdraft of the joint account of 
approximately $6,000. This overdraft was created by Mr. Carney 
when he deposited a worthless check for $7,100 and drew a $6,000 
check against it. 
Since Mr. Carney could not be located, a quasi in rem action 
was brought against Mrs. Carney. A jury verdict in her favor was 
affirmed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. The court 
held that Mrs. Carney was not liable since she had neither partic- 
ipated in negotiating the overdraft check nor received any pro- 
ceeds from it. Further, since Cambridge Trust had failed to exer- 
cise ordinary care in permitting Mr. Carney to make the over- 
draft, the court held that Mrs. Carney was not bound by the 
indemnification agreement.3 
The relationship between a bank and its customers with re- 
spect to overdrafts is governed by article 4 of the Uniform Com- 
mercial Code (UCC) and relevant case law interpreting that arti- 
cle. 
A. Liability for Overdrafts i n  General 
A bank may properly charge a check to a depositor's account 
even though the charge creates an 0verdraft.l There is no obliga- 
tion on a bank to pay an o ~ e r d r a f t , ~  however, and no such obliga- 
tion arises merely because the bank has previously permitted 
overdrafts by the same depositor." 
3. 333 A.2d at 445. 
4. IJNIFOHM COMMERCIAL CODE [hereinafter cited as UCC] O 4-401; see, e .g. ,  City 
Bank v. Tenn, 52 Hawaii 51, 469 P.2d 816 (1970); State v. Mullin, 225 N.W.2d 305 (Iowa 
1975); Bond State Bank v. Vaughn, 241 Ky. 524, 44 S.W.2d 527 (1931). 
5. UCC 4 4-401(1); see, e .g. ,  Orlich v. Rubio Sav. Bank, 240 Iowa 1074, 38 N.W.2d 
622 (1949); Modoc Meat & Cattle Co. v. First State Bank, 532 P.2d 21 (Ore. 1975). 
6. See, e .g . ,  Orlich v. Rubio Sav. Bank, 240 Iowa 1074, 38 N.W.2d 622 (1949); Mag- 
ness v. Equitable Trust Co., 176 Md. 528,6 A.2d 241 (1939); First Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l 
Bank, 127 Tenn. 205, 154 S.W. 965 (1913). 
There is disagreement among various state courts concerning whether a bank may 
enter into a valid agreement with a depositor to honor his overdraft checks. Some courts 
have refused to enforce such agreements. Dolan v. Danbury State Bank, 207 Iowa 597, 223 
N.W. 400 (1929); S.R.&P. Import Co. v. American Union Bank, 122 Misc. 798,204 N.Y.S. 
755 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1924); Brown v. Mutual Trust Co., 267 Pa. 523, 110 A. 155 
(1920). Other courts have upheld such agreements. Industrial Trust, Title & Sav. Co. v. 
CASE NOTES 
By drawing a check in excess of the balance in his account, 
the depositor impliedly promises to repay the bank the amount 
of the overdraft.' The bank's payment of the overdraft is consid- 
ered a loan to the depositor that  is authorized by the check;R 
thereafter, the bank can maintain an action to recover the 
amount of the overdraft from the depos i t~ r .~  Although a bank 
Weakley, 103 Ala. 458, 15 So. 854 (1894); Saylors v. State Bank, 99 Kan. 515, 163 P. 454 
(1917). 
7. UCC (i 4-401(1), Comment 1; see, e.g., People's Nat'l Bank v. Rhoades, 28 Del. 
65, 90 A. 409 (1913); Becker v. Fuller, 99 Misc. 672, 164 N.Y.S. 495 (Sup. Ct. Monroe 
County 1917). 
8. UCC 4 4-401(1), Comment 1; see, e.g., City Bank v. Tenn, 52 Hawaii 51, 469 P.2d 
816 (1970); Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Nichols & Shepard Co., 223 Ill. 41,79 N.E. 38 (1906); 
State v. Mullin, 225 N.W.2d 305 (Iowa 1975); Nebraska State Bank v. Sherlock, 180 Neb. 
772, 145 N.W.2d 573 (1966); Bank of N.M. v. Pinion, 57 N.M. 428, 259 P.2d 791 (1953). 
9. See note 7 supra. 
In addition to the right to sue for the amount of an overdraft, a bank may make a 
setoff in the amount of the overdraft against a general deposit that is not restricted in use. 
Martinez v. Nat'l City Bank, 80 F. Supp. 545 (D.P.R. 1948); Nichols v. State, 46 Neb. 
715, 65 N.W. 774 (1896). If the depositor claims that the money deposited was a special 
deposit rather than a general deposit and therefore not subject to a setoff, the depositor 
has the burden of proving that the bank was notified of the special purpose of the deposit. 
First Nat'l Bank v. City Nat'l Bank, 102 Mo. App. 357, 76 S.W. 489 (1903); Foulkrod v. 
First Nat'l Bank, 70 Misc. 2d 616, 334 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Seneca County Ct. 1972). If a 
depositor has two accounts, the bank may make a setoff against one account for an  
overdraft in the other. Hiller v. Bank of Columbia, 92 S.C. 445, 79 S.E. 899 (1912). This 
setoff can be made whenever both accounts belong to the same individual, even if the 
accounts are in different names. Cooper v. Public Nat'l Bank, 208 App. Div. 430, 203 
N.Y.S. 642 (1st Dep't 1924). It is also true where one account is savings and the other 
checking. Cowen v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 67 Ariz. 210, 193 P.2d 918 (1948); Bromberg v. 
Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 58 Cal. App. 2d 1, 135 P.2d 689 (1943); 
Pursiful v. First State Bank, 251 Ky. 498, 65 S.W.2d 462 (1933). 
Generally a payor bank cannot recover its loss on an overdraft from an outsider to 
the account who received payment for the check if that person had presented the check 
to the bank in good faith. The reason for this rule is that an overdraft is considered a loan 
by the bank to the drawer, and the bank should therefore look to the drawer for repay- 
ment. See Vandagrift v. Masonic Home, 242 Mo. 138, 145 S.W. 448 (1912). A person 
fraudulently obtaining money on an overdraft, however, may be liable. Iowa State Bank 
v. Cereal Refund & Brokerage Co., 132 Iowa 248, 109 N.W. 719 (1906). 
The right of a bank to recover from a principal for an overdraft made by his agent 
depends on whether or not the agent was authorized to overdraw. Wheatley v. Kutz, 19 
Ind. App. 293, 49 N.E. 391 (1898). If the agent was given express authority, the principal 
may be liable for the overdraft. Id. Where the agent was not given express authority but 
the principal nevertheless allowed the agent habitually to overdraw the principal's ac- 
count, the bank may assume that the principal will cancel any subsequent overdrafts. 
Merchants' & Planters' Nat'l Bank v. Clifton Mfg. Co., 56 S.C. 320, 33 S.E. 750 (1899). 
The mere authority given to an agent to draw checks against the principal's account does 
not include the authority to overdraw. Faulkner v. Bank of Italy, 69 Cal. App. 370, 231 P. 
380 (1924). If the agent does overdraw, the principal will not be liable unless special 
circumstances exist that constitute an estoppel or ratification. Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. 
Nichols & Shephard Co., 223 Ill. 41, 79 N.E. 38 (1906). See also Torrance Nat'l Bank v. 
Enesco Fed. Credit Union, 134 Cal. App. 2d 316, 285 P.2d 737 (1955). An agent who 
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generally may recover for an overdraft, certain acts of negligence 
or bad faith by the bank may preclude it from recovering.1° 
B. Liability for Overdrafts of Joint Accounts 
There is considerable confusion in banking law concerning 
whether one cosignatory on a joint account can be held liable for 
an overdraft made by another cosignatory.ll This confusion is due 
largely to the vagueness of the UCCI2 and the scarcity and incon- 
sistency of the relevant case law. l3 
Unfortunately, the confusion is not alleviated by the typical 
signature card signed by each cosignatory, which is the contract 
by which the joint cosignatories are bound to each other and to 
the bank.IJ While the typical signature card by its terms permits 
any single cosignatory to draw the full amount on deposit in the 
joint account,I5 it does not expressly provide that cosignatories 
shall be severally liable for the full amount of any overdraft.'" 
Although the UCC does not address this issue directly, some 
overdraws his principal's account without authority may be personally liable for the 
overdraft. See Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Stockyards Loan Co., 16 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1926). 
10. Citizens State Bank v. Western Union Tel. Co., 172 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1949). A 
bank generally may recover for an overdraft even when payment was made by the bank 
under the mistaken belief that there was a sufficient amount on deposit to cover the 
overdraft. Morris v. First Nat'l Bank, 162 Ala. 301, 50 So. 137 (1909); James River Nat'l 
Bank v. Weber, 19 N.D. 702, 124 N.W. 952 (1910). 
11. Cambridge Trust Co. v. Carney, 333 A.2d 442, 444 (N.H. 1975). Compare 3 R. 
ANDIMON. IJNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 9 4-401:4, a t  300 (2d ed. 1971) with W. HAWKLAND, 
A THANSACTIONAI. C r l l l D ~  TO THE IJCC 4 1.740301, a t  385-86 (1964). 
12. See notes 17-22 and accompanying text infra. 
13. See Halls & Hauenstein, The  Uniform Commercial Code i n  Minnesota: Article 
4-Rank Deposits and Collections, 50 MINN. L. REV. 1027, 1041 (1966); 2 UNIFORM LAWS 
ANNOTATED. IJNIFORM ~ O M M E R C I A I ,  CODE 9 4-401, a t  376 (1963, Supp. 1975, a t  208-11). 
14. See Landretto v. First Trust & Sav. Bank, 333 Ill. 442, 448-49, 164 N.E. 836, 839 
(1928). 
15. Id. 
The portions of a typical joint signature card that are relevant to the collection of 
overdrafts on a joint account are as follows: 
The joint depositors . . . agree with each other and with the above bank 
that all sums now on deposit heretofore or hereafter deposited by any one or 
more of said joint depositors, with all accumulations thereon, are and shall be 
owned by them jointly . . . and be subject to the check . . . of any one or more 
of them . . . and payment to or on the check or receipt of any one or more of 
them . . . shall be valid and discharge said bank from liability. Each of the joint 
depositors . . . appoints each of the others attorney, with power to deposit in 
said joint account moneys of the grantor of this power and for that purpose to 
endorse any check, draft, note or other instrument payable to the order of said 
grantor or to him and to any others of said joint depositors. 
*Joint Account Signature Card, First Security Bank of Utah. 
16. Id. See also Faiilkner v. Bank of Italy, 69 Cal. App. 370, 231 P. 380 (1924). 
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commentators argue that the Code imposes liability on a cosigna- 
tory for an overdraft even though he had nothing to do with its 
creation.'' These commentators rely on section 4-401(1), which 
provides that "[als against its customer, a bank may charge 
against his account any item which is otherwise properly payable 
from that account even though the charge creates an overdraft."'" 
"Account" is defined in section 4-104(a) as "any account with a 
bank and includes a checking, time, interest or savings ac- 
count."lY "Customer" is defined as "any person having an ac- 
count with a bank or for whom a bank has agreed to collect items 
and includes a bank carrying an account with another bank."z0 
The advocates of liability conclude that since the broad definition 
of account clearly includes a joint account and since any cosigna- 
tory on a joint account would be a customer, the bank can collect 
the amount of an overdraft from any cosignatory on a joint ac- 
count.2' Other commentators, however, maintain that section 4- 
401(1) was not meant to extend so far as to include joint deposi- 
tors and joint accounts.22 The case law is similarly divided. 
Only three cases have considered the liability of cosignatories 
on a joint account since the adoption of the Uniform Commercial 
Code.2% the first, National Bank v.  Derh~rnrner ,~~  a lower Penn- 
- 
17. B. CLARK & A. SQUII.I,ANTE. HE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, COLLECTIONS AND CREDIT 
CARDS 35-36 (1970); W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UCC § 1.70301, at 385- 
86 (1964). 
18. UCC 0 4-401(1). 
19. UCC Ej 4-104(l)(a). 
20. UCC 0 4-104(l)(e). 
21. See note 17 supra. 
22. One important commentator simply states as follows: 
The Code does not alter the prior rule that in the case of a joint account 
one cosignatory cannot be held beyond the balance in the account and that a 
joint deposit does not make each cosignatory the agent of the other with respect 
to the making of overdrafts. 
3 R. ANDERSON. UNIFORM COMMERCIAI, CODE 4 4-401:4, a t  300 (2d ed. 1971). 
23. A number of cases treated this issue prior to the adoption of the UCC. These cases 
are important since they indicate the wide variety of circumstances under which this issue 
may arise. The first pre-Code case to specifically deal with the respective liability of joint 
depositors in a joint account was Adams v. First Nat'l Bank, 113 N.C. 332, 18 S.E. 513 
(1893). In that case the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that a bank cannot charge 
an overdraft of a partnership joint account against the individual account of a partner. 
Id. at 335, 18 S.E. a t  514. In dicta, however, the court said that the partner could be held 
personally liable for the overdraft even though he did not create it. Id. a t  336, 18 S.E. a t  
515. In the Tennessee case of Bank of Bellbuckle v. Mason, 139 Tenn. 659, 202 S.W. 931 
(1918), it was held that where one partner notified his bank that he would not be responsi- 
ble for any overdrafts made by his partner in their joint account, such notice was binding 
on the bank and he was not liable for a subsequent overdraft made by his partner. He 
was liable, however, for the amount of an overdraft paid to him personally, even though 
504 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1976: 
sylvania court held that a cosignatory is not liable for an overdraft 
of his joint account unless he either participated in the negotia- 
tion of the worthless check by which the account was "opened"25 
or received funds as a result of his cosignatory's fraud.26 A similar 
result was reached in Nielson v. Suburban Trust & Savings 
Bank,27 where the bank had permitted a woman to make a with- 
drawal from the joint savings account that she shared with her 
husband even though she did not have the passbook. The follow- 
ing day, her husband presented the passbook to make a with- 
drawal. Since the passbook did not indicate the previous day's 
he did not know a t  the time he received the money that it was from an overdraft. Id. at  
668-70, 202 S.W. a t  932-33. In another pre-Code case, Popp v. Exchange Bank, 189 Cal. 
296, 208 P. 113 (1922), the Supreme Court of California held that where a joint account 
was opened in the name of a husband and wife with money belonging to the wife, the wife 
was liable for the overdraft made by her husband even though she probably never drew 
any checks on the account. Id., 208 P. a t  115. Two years later, the California court of 
appeals in Faulkner v. Bank of Italy, 69 Cal. App. 370, 231 P. 380 (1924) distinguished 
the Popp decision and held that one who introduces a customer to a bank in good faith 
and becomes a cosignatory on a joint account with that customer merely for the conveni- 
ence of the customer is not liable for an overdraft made by the customer. Id. a t  371-72, 
231 P. at  382. The court stressed that the person who introduced the customer neither 
endorsed the check by which the joint account was opened nor had anything to do with 
the drawing of the check which created the overdraft. Id. a t  371, 231 P. a t  381. In 1956, 
the Supreme Court of North Carolina in First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Raynor, 243 
N.C. 417, 90 S.E.2d 894 (1956) followed the Faulkner decision, holding that a husband 
was not liable for an overdraft made by his wife of their joint account. The wife, without 
the knowledge or consent of her husband, deposited an unendorsed check payable to her 
husband into their joint account and immediately drew a check on the account, relying 
on the credit of the deposited check. But since her husband had stopped payment on the 
deposited check, the wife's check caused an overdraft. The court based its decision on 
the fact that the husband did not participate in any way in creating the overdraft; he 
neither endorsed the check which was deposited nor had any knowledge that the deposit 
had been made. Id. a t  418-19, 90 S.E.2d a t  897. 
24. 16 Pa. D. & C.2d 286 (1958). 
25. It can be inferred from Derhammer that a cosignatory could be liable for an 
overdraft of his joint account if he participated in the negotiation of not only the worthless 
check by which the account was opened, but also any check that overdraws the account. 
26. Id. at  289. In Derhammer, the defendant and another were cosignatories on a joint 
account with the plaintiff bank. The only deposit in the account was a check to the other 
cosignatory for $4,950 drawn by a third party. The bank paid $150 in cash against the 
original deposit to either the defendant or the other cosignatory. It also paid to the 
"account owners" $2,800 on a check signed by "one of the joint makers." The original 
check for $4,950, by which the account was opened, was drawn upon a fictitious bank. 
The plaintiff bank consequently brought suit to recover the $2,950 i t  had paid. The court 
stated that a cosignatory to a joint account is not personally liable beyond the funds 
deposited in the joint account for transactions made by his cosignatory that result in an 
overdraft. The court held that since the bank did not specifically allege in its complaint 
that the defendant was responsible for the negotiation of the $4,950 check or was enriched 
by the fraud of the defendant's cosignatory, the complaint was not sufficiently specific. 
Id. at 286-89. 
27. 37 Ill. App. 2d 324, 185 N.E.2d 404 (1st Dist. 1962). 
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withdrawal made by his wife, he was able to make a withdrawal 
that overdrew the account. The Illinois appellate court rejected 
the bank's argument that an overdraft of a joint account is an 
indebtedness of each joint depositor, holding that the bank could 
not charge the wife's individual account with the overdraft made 
by her husband in their joint account.28 In contrast to Derhammer 
and Nielson, the Missouri court of appeals held in Bremen Bank 
& Trust Co. v. B ~ g d a n ~ ~  that although a woman was a cosignatory 
on her husband's business account only for convenience and had 
no ownership interest in the business, she was liable as a joint 
tenant for an overdraft of that account. 
Cambridge Trust alleged that  Mrs. Carney was liable pri- 
marily as a cosignatory on the joint account30 and alternatively 
pursuant to the indemnification agreement that she had ~ igned .~ '  
In ruling on the bank's claim that Mrs. Carney was liable as a 
cosignatory on the joint account, the court held, without signifi- 
cant analysis," that "[slince Mrs. Carney neither participated 
in the transaction creating the overdraft nor received funds as a 
result of it, she cannot be held liable for payment of it."33 
In rejecting the alternative claim that Mrs. Carney was liable 
pursuant to the indemnification agreement, the court relied on 
the provisions of UCC section 4-103(1)34 that limit the effective- 
ness of such an agreement to situations where a bank exercises 
ordinary care." The court reasoned that "[wlhile allowing an 
28. Id. at  234, 185 N.E.2d at  408. 
29. 498 S.W.2d 306 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973). 
30. The bank maintained that since Mrs. Carney was a cosignatory on the joint 
account from which the funds attached by the bank originally came, those funds were 
liable for payment of the overdraft of the joint account. 333 A.2d at  444. 
31. Id. at  445. 
32. The court merely noted the scarcity of decisional law and the division among 
commentators as to the effect of UCC 4 4-401(1) and then rendered its decision without 
explicitly interpreting that section. Id. a t  444-45. See also notes 17-29 and accompanying 
text supra. 
33. 333 A.2d at  445. In deciding the instant case the court expressly relied upon 
Faulker and Derhammer. Id. at  444-45. The holding in the instant case differs from the 
holding in Derhammer since the cosignatory against whom the bank was trying to recover 
in Derhammer either would have had to participate in the negotiation of the worthless 
check that was used to open the account-rather than in the check that created the 
overdraft-or would have had to receive proceeds as a result of the other cosignatory's 
fraud rather than from the overdraft check. Id. a t  445; note 26 and accompanying text 
supra. 
34. 333 A.2d at  445. 
35. Id. 
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overdraft does not generally constitute failure to exercise ordinary 
care,"" in this case the jury could have found a lack of ordinary 
care since the assistant treasurer, who had been concerned about 
Mr. Carney's six prior overdrafts, was not notified of the overdraft 
despite his request to be so informed.37 Thus, the court concluded 
that the jury could have properly found Mrs. Carney not liable 
"on the basis of the indemnification agreement and card which 
she signed."3u 
The instant case is the first state supreme court,case since 
the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code39 to rule on the 
respective liabilities of cosignatories on a joint bank account for 
an overdraft. One of the UCC's underlying purposes and policies 
is "to make uniform the law among the various  jurisdiction^."^^ 
In furtherance of this purpose, there is a general policy among the 
courts that the decisional law of the highest tribunal of one juris- 
diction should be uniformly followed by other  jurisdiction^.^' Con- 
sequently, the instant case assumes an eminent position in the 
law dealing with the liabilities of cosignatories on joint bank ac- 
counts. 
The remainder of the casenote will examine (1) the appropri- 
36. Id. 
37. Id. The court stated that 
the assistant treasurer of Cambridge Trust testified tha t .  . . he had become so 
concerned about the six overdrafts made by Mr. Carney within a two-month 
period that he instructed the person handling the records for the account to 
notify him immediately in the event of any large overdrafts. The record indi- 
cates that he was not notified. 
38. Id. 
39. New Hampshire adopted the UCC on July 1, 1961. 1 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM 
COMMEHCIAI. CODE ix (2d ed. 1971). 
40. UCC Ej 1-102(2)(c). 
41. See, e.g., Evans v. Everett, 10 N.C. App. 435, 437, 179 S.E.2d 120, 122 (1971). 
The purpose and policy of the UCC "to make uniform the law among the various jurisdic- 
tions" cannot be accomplished unless the courts of each jurisdiction follow the decisions 
in other jurisdictions that interpret the UCC. But see J .  WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK 
OF THE LAW ~ J N D E R  THE ~ J N I F O R M  COMMERCIAL CODE 9 (1972): 
Courts in the same state will likely follow the footsteps of their predecessors, 
even where those footsteps have gone astray . . . . 
Is a Code case in another jurisdiction entitled to special weight because of 
the policy of uniformity in commercial law? From time to time a court bows to 
this policy, but in most cases the court seems more concerned that its decision 
be right than that it be parallel with another state's. Certainly there are Code 
decisions that other courts should not follow. 
(Footnotes omitted.) 
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ateness of the court's interpretation and application of UCC sec- 
tion 4-401(1), (2) the scope of the test adopted by the court, (3)  
the intent of the parties as another test that should be applied in 
determining liability, and (4) the effect that an indemnification 
agreement between the bank and the cosignatories should have. 
A. Application of the UCC 
As shown above, there are conflicting opinions concerning 
whether UCC section 4-401(1) can be properly interpreted to give 
a bank the power to recover the amount of an overdraft of a joint 
account from a cosignatory who was not directly responsible for 
the creation of the overdraft.42 In the instant case, although the 
court relied upon UCC section 4-401(1) as the controlling statu- 
tory law," it did not articulate its construction of that section. It 
can be assumed from the holding, however, that the court did not 
read section 4-401(1) broadly enough to permit a bank to recover 
from any cosignatory on a joint account without regard to who 
made the overdraft or who received the proceeds from it.44 
Section 1-102(1) of the UCC states that "[tlhis Act shall be 
liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying pur- 
poses and p~licies."'~ One of those underlying purposes and poli- 
cies is "to permit the continued expansion of commercial prac- 
tices through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties."46 To 
the extent the Code encourages banks to pay overdrafts by allow- 
ing them to recover from the maker, it tends to promote this 
underlying purpose of expanding commercial practices. In paying 
an overdraft, the bank is extending credit to the person or entity 
tha t  created the overdraft. This increases the buying power 
within the economy, which in turn tends to expand commerce. 
Furthermore, encouraging banks to pay overdraft checks may 
have two other salutary effects: (1) the acceptability of checks as 
"legal tender" may be increased, and (2) there may be less 
handling of commercial paper through the banks, which would 
reduce their expenses and create a savings that could be passed 
on to customers. 
Banks would not knowingly pay overdrafts unless they were 
assured of their ability to recover the amount of any overdraft 
42. See notes 17-22 and accompanying text supra. 
43. 333 A.2d at 444. 
44. See generally notes 17-22 and accompanying text supra. 
45. UCC Ej 1-102(1). 
46. UCC Ej 1-102(2)(b). 
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from its creator. Section 4-401(1) of the UCC was designed not 
only to permit banks to pay overdrafts, but also to protect banks4' 
by giving them the legal right to recover the amount of overdrafts 
they pay.lx But if the courts construe section 4-401(1) such that 
its application denies recovery to banks for the amount of the 
overdrafts of joint accounts from any of the cosignatories (as the 
court did in the instant case), then the protection afforded banks 
that  pay overdrafts of joint accounts will be substantially de- 
creased. Consequently, the frequency with which banks pay over- 
drafts of joint accounts would be reduced, and the underlying 
purpose of the UCC to continue the expansion of commercial 
practices would not be served.19 Therefore, in construing section 
4-401(1), courts should carefully consider the UCC's underlying 
purposes and policies and the effect any decision will have on 
them. 
B. Scope of the  Test  Applied in the Instant Case 
In the instant case, the court applied an "either/or9' test to 
determine when a cosignatory is liable for an overdraft of his joint 
account. If he either participates in the transaction that creates 
the overdraft, or receives funds as a result of it, he is liable? 
Although the court had little difficulty applying this test in the 
instant case," problems may arise in future cases involving differ- 
ent facts. 
The test used by the court lends itself to both a narrow and 
a broad interpretation. A narrow interpretation would not make 
a cosignatory on a joint account liable for an overdraft unless he 
actually wrote the overdraft check, helped negotiate it, or ob- 
tained actual funds from the overdraft. Such an interpretation 
has the advantages of resolving confusion-thereby promoting 
predictability in this area of the law-and achieving judicial 
economy. 
47. The report of the New York State Law Revision Commission declares that  "[a] 
. . . provision protecting a depository bank which pays an item in good faith is contained 
in Section 4-401." 2 REPORT OF THE N.Y. STATE LAW REVISION COMM'N FOR 1955, STUDY OF 
THE IJNIFOKM COMMERCIAL CODE 65 (1955). 
48. UCC 4 4-401(1), Comment 1. See notes 4-9 and accompanying text supra. 
49. On the other hand, if banks could recover for an overdraft of a joint bank account 
from any cosignatory without regard to who created the overdraft or who received the 
funds from it, commercial practices arguably would not be expanded since unjust results 
would occur with such frequency that customers would be discouraged from maintaining 
joint accounts. 
50. 333 A.2d at 445. 
51. See id. 
4991 CASE NOTES 509 
A broad interpretation, on the other hand, could make a joint 
depositor liable even if he did not actually participate in the 
negotiation of the check or receive the actual proceeds from it. For 
example, although a joint depositor may not personally have writ- 
ten or negotiated the check that created the overdraft, i t  is never- 
theless conceivable that he participated sufficiently in creating 
the overdraft that he should be held liable for it. That is, his 
knowledge of, consent to, or encouragement in the creation of the 
overdraft may be sufficient to constitute participation in its crea- 
tion. Likewise, although a joint depositor does not receive the 
actual funds from the overdraft, he may receive "funds as a result 
of it."52 A business or marriage partner may be considered to have 
received funds as a result of the second partner's overdraft to the 
extent that the money from the overdraft received by the second 
partner released other funds for the use by the first partner. 
The wide range of situations in which overdrafts in joint 
accounts have arisens indicates that for future cases to be de- 
cided properly the test developed in the instant case should not 
be construed so narrowly as to permit recovery by a bank only in 
limited circumstances. Rather, a broad interpretation of this test 
that considers all relevant circumstances should be employed. 
C. Intent as an Additional Test 
Even when the test used by the court in the instant case is 
not satisfied, circumstances may exist in which liability should 
nevertheless be imposed. An additional test that should be ap- 
plied is the intent of the parties-cosignatories and bank-with 
respect to potential liability for overdrafts when the joint account 
was originally created. For example, if the bank and the cosigna- 
tories originally intended that liability extend to all cosignatories 
for any overdraft and all cosignatories actively used the account, 
liability should attach even if the cosignatory who did not create 
the overdraft neither participated in nor received funds as a result 
of the check that created the overdraft. Further, in situations 
where one cosignatory is solvent and the others are not, the bank 
should be able to rely on the former for any overdrafts. Thus, the 
intent of the parties is a n  important additional inquiry that 
52. It is an uncontradicted fact that Mrs. Carney had nothing to do with the negotia- 
tion of the check that created the overdraft and did not receive-funds from it. Appellant's 
Brief at  7-8; Appellee's Brief a t  6-7. 
53. See notes 23-29 and accompanying text supra. 
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should be made by courts in these cases. This inquiry requires 
courts to examine many factors. 
The purpose for which the person from whom the bank is 
trying to recover became a cosignatory on the joint account is 
important in determining intent of the parties with respect to 
liability. If he became a cosignatory for his own benefit or the 
mutual benefit of himself and any of the other joint depositors, 
his responsibility for an overdraft that he did not create should 
be greater than if he became a cosignatory merely for the benefit 
or convenience of another c~s igna to ry .~~  Thus, the degree to which 
a cosignatory is to be benefited by the joint account indicates his 
probable intent to be burdened or bear liability for overdrafts 
created by another. 
Courts should also carefully examine the type and closeness 
of the relationship between the cosignatories on the joint account. 
Such relationships as partner-partner, principal-agent, and 
independent-dependent should have a bearing on the respective 
liabilities for overdrafts of co- depositor^.^^ For example, a child 
who is a cosignatory on his parents' account for mere convenience 
should not be held responsible for an overdraft created by one of 
his parents. But if an agency or other business relationship exists 
between the cosignatories, it is more likely that the parties in- 
tended joint and several liability, and liability should more read- 
ily be imposed. 
Another important fact that courts should consider is 
whether or not there is an overdraft protection agreement be- 
tween the bank and the cosignatory. By such an agreement, the 
bank promises to pay the depositors' overdrafts up to and not 
beyond a certain amount.56 In return, the cosignatory promises to 
54. In Faulkner v. Bank of Italy, 69 Cal. App. 370, 231 P. 380 (1924), a case on which 
the court in the instant case placed substantial reliance, 333 A.2d at 445, the cosignatory, 
who did not make the overdraft but against whom the bank was trying to recover, became 
a joint depositor on the account merely for the convenience and benefit of the other joint 
depositor. The cosignatory was found not to be liable for the overdraft. Faulkner was 
distinguished from Popp v. Exchange Bank, 189 Cal. 296, 208 P. 113 (1922), which held 
that an overdraft of a joint account was an indebtedness of both cosignatories. The distin- 
guishing feature was that the joint account in Popp was for the mutual benefit of both 
cosignatories. Faulkner v. Bank of Italy, supra at 373, 231 P. a t  382. 
55. See note 9 supra. 
56. A typical overdraft protection agreement provides: 
[Tlhe undersigned jointly and severally agree as follows: 
1. "Central Bank" shall guarantee payment of any personal check drawn 
on it  by any of the undersigned to the named payee provided all the terms and 
conditions on the Check Guarantee card are satisfied. 
2. "Central Bank" shall honor all guaranteed checks. 
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repay the bank for the amount of these overdrafts. I t  can be 
argued that the cosignatory should be able to rely on the bank not 
to pay overdrafts above the ceiling, and therefore need not repay 
the bank for overdrafts that exceed the ceiling amount. Con- 
versely, it can be argued that the cosignatory impliedly promises 
to pay any overdrafts-that the ceiling amount was merely a 
guarantee that the bank would make payment a t  least up to that  
amount-and any excess the bank chose to.pay on an overdraft 
would remain the obligation of the cosignatory. Of course, the 
terms of the agreement and, especially where the terms are un- 
clear, any representations made or circumstances surrounding 
the agreement should be carefully considered by the examining 
courts. 
A fourth circumstance, the existence of an indemnification 
agreement between the bank and the cosignatories, is also rele- 
vant to the determination of the parties' intent to impose joint 
and several liability on the cosignatories for all overdrafts. In 
form, an indemnification agreement represents the express intent 
of the parties to impose such liability. But, as discussed below, 
such an agreement may not in substance accurately reflect the 
intent of the cosignatories. 
D. Effect of an Indemnification Agreement 
The holding in the instant case suggests that although Mrs. 
Carney was not liable under UCC section 4-401(1) merely as a 
cosignatory on the joint account, she would have been liable 
under the terms of the indemnification agreement she executed 
with the bank had there been no evidence of negligence on the 
3. The undersigned hereby expressly waive any right to stop payment on 
any guaranteed checks. 
4. The undersigned shall not exceed the established line of credit or credit 
limits authorized for their account when this card was issued or as the same may 
be revised from time to time. The undersigned fully understands that any guar- 
anteed check negotiated which causes the line of credit or credit limit to be 
exceeded shall be considered a "short check" and may be a felony and punisha- 
ble by fine or imprisonment or both. 
5. The undersigned also agree to pay "Central Bank" its normal charge 
for a non-sufficient funds item for each guaranteed check negotiated which 
causes the established line of credit to be exceeded. 
6. To pay reasonable attorney's fees incurred by "Central Bank" not in 
excess of 15'; of the unpaid debt after default in the enforcement of the obliga- 
tions hereunder and waive to the extent permitted by law the pleading of the 
Statute of Limitations. 
Check Guarantee Agreement, Central Bank & Trust Co., Provo, Utah. 
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part of the bank.J7 This suggests that it is likely that such agree- 
ments will be used more extensively in the future in joint ac- 
counts in an attempt by banks to avoid the result obtained in the 
instant case. Form agreements such as these, however, may tend 
to be contracts of adhesion, not reflecting the true intent of the 
cosignatories.5~ourts hould squarely confront these agreements 
and determine whether they will enforce them even when the 
effect will be contrary to the intent of the cosignatories and ineq- 
uity will clearly result, or whether they will refuse to enforce them 
on grounds of unconscionability. 
The explicit policy of the UCC to continue the expansion of 
commercial practices places an affirmative duty on courts to in- 
terpret section 4-401(1) such that liability will be imposed on all 
cosignatories of a joint account unless the intent of the parties, 
negligence or bad faith of the bank, or the unconscionability of 
an indemnification agreement indicate that liability should not 
be imposed. To assure the consistent achievement of proper re- 
sults in future cases, courts should employ a broad interpretation 
of the test used in the instant case in which all relevant circum- 
stances are considered. 
57. 333 A.2d at 445. See notes 34-38 and accompanying text supra. 
58. See generally Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 
(1960); UCC § 2-302. 
